

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Chenoweth

National Intelligence Council

NIC #05646-86
16 December 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Brig Gen Frank B. Horton III, USAF
ChairmanSUBJECT: Organization of the NIC to Support the
Analysis of LIC

1. Reference your concern that the NIC could be better organized to address LIC, or at least the insurgency/counterinsurgency component of same, we have, as advertised, done some soul searching within the NIC family. We have additionally had some discussions with Dick Kerr, [redacted] and Paul Gorman on the subject, and had a NIC-wide seminar which also included representatives from the DDI and DDO insurgency centers. That seminar was led by Dr. Bard O'Neill from the National War College faculty, whose thorough-going framework for the analysis of insurgency and counterinsurgency across regional lines was very well received. He will be forwarding us a refined written version of that framework within the next few weeks, a copy of which we will forward to you for your information. Out of all this, we developed a range of organizational options and a recommendation for your consideration. The list does not include doing nothing, for we agree with you that we could do a better job in LIC-related analysis, in particular in the insurgency/counterinsurgency area.

25X1

2. The range of options in order of our preference, from first to last, was informed by an incremental approach, believing that we might be able to do that which was needed with a minimum of additional resources, judiciously applied; and that if we turned out to be wrong, it would be relatively easy to scale up; while on the other hand cutting back, if we started big and found we had gone farther than we needed to, would be more difficult. Thus our order would be as follows:

- (a) Add to the Analytic Group a broad-gauged expert on insurgency/counterinsurgency analysis, who would generate his/her own estimates that would cross regional lines, and also work with the NIO/GPF and regional NIOs to scrub Concept Papers, TORs, and drafts of their estimates that related to this area. This addition to the AG staff would assure that all relevant questions from a

25X1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

comprehensive framework for analysis were asked and reasonably answered, especially regarding patterns (or lack thereof) and strengths (or vulnerabilities) regarding Soviet involvement in insurgency/counterinsurgency.

- (b) Upgrade the above to an A/NIO to the NIO At Large that runs the AG.
- (c) Upgrade the above to a separate Special Assistant to the Chairman, NIC but with no additional supporting staff.
- (d) Upgrade the above to a full NIO, with initially one assistant and one secretary for support.
- (e) Pull one or both of the DDI and/or DDO insurgency analysis centers into a permanent, formal relationship with the new NIO, who would be a co-chair of the center along the pattern established for counterterrorism.

3. We are prepared to pursue our proposal as outlined in paragraph 2.(a) immediately, with your approval. We have already discussed this with Dick Kerr [redacted] and they concur with our preference. We would make a formal request to Kerr for one of his best to serve as the NIC focal point within the AG. Inasmuch as we are about to reach our manpower ceilings as we man up to accomplish our largest-ever Production Plan, this person would likely have to be on a non-reimbursable basis unless an additional slot were to be found for the AG from elsewhere within DCI resources. If it then appeared that an A/NIO or Special Assistant to the C/NIC were needed to create additional "clout," this upgrade could be easily accomplished with the individual we would have selected and put in place in the AG. If we then needed to move to a full-up NIO, we would retain the A/NIO or Special Assistant as A/NIO most likely, but would need at least one new additional position for the NIC--for a secretary--and perhaps a second at the SIS-04 level for the new NIO--although the second NIC Deputy Chairman position might be used for this purpose. We would also need additional floor space--we have none left within crowded NIC spaces for a new three-person team until the new building opens and the NIC gains more square footage. The search for a capable NIO might take us a while, to do justice to the position. Any or all of the above, of course, could be accomplished if you desire, with your support on the needed resources. Most difficult, in an approach Graham, I, [redacted] and Dick Kerr would recommend against at this time would be Option 2.(e), i.e., an NIO co-chairing a combined DDI and/or DDO insurgency/counterinsurgency center. While this approach has worked reasonably well in the counterterrorism area, we do not feel that the breadth of intelligence inputs, policy outputs, and operational players in insurgency/counterinsurgency business would lend themselves to a Langley-based combined center approach nearly so well.

4. Our bottom line, then, is that we recommend that we start with the approach outlined in paragraph 2.(a) above--with the option to move up to the option of 2.(d) if the intervening steps are tested and appear to be

25X1

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

inadequate. We could use an additional slot even for Option 2.(a), and would need at least one more, for a secretary, for Option 2.(d). We would not propose consideration of Option 2.(e) at this time.

Very respectfully,


Frank B. Horton III

APPROVED:

Option 2.(a) with additional slot to be obtained within DCI resources (person to be hired on reimbursable basis):

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Date

OR

Option 2.(a) with no slot added to current NIC resources (person to be hired on a non-reimbursable basis):

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Date

OR

Prefer to start at a higher level--specifically: _____

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Date

cc: DDI
DDO

3
CONFIDENTIAL